How Saudi Yanbu, UAE Fujairah, and a redrawn Russian supply chain kept Indian refineries running through the Hormuz disruption — and where the system is now most exposed.
On March 19, 2026, 89% of Saudi crude reaching Indian ports transited through the Strait of Hormuz. By April 28, that figure had fallen to just 11%.
At the basin level, the shift was equally dramatic. Through February, Indian refiners sourced roughly 60% of their crude from the Persian Gulf. By April, that share had dropped below 35%.
Two simultaneous reorganizations — one at the country level and another at the basin level — reshaped India’s crude supply chain, even as the total volume Saudi Arabia placed into the Indian market changed only marginally.
The Headline
In February 2026, Saudi Arabia supplied Indian refiners almost entirely through the Strait of Hormuz. Weekly liftings from Ras Tanura and Jubail averaged roughly 1.0–1.3 million barrels per day (mbpd), reflecting the traditional trade pattern that had governed Saudi-India crude flows for decades. Yanbu, on Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast, contributed virtually nothing to the India trade
Eight weeks later, the picture had inverted.
By the second half of April 2026, Saudi crude reaching India was loading almost entirely at Yanbu, peaking at roughly 1.43 mbpd in a single week, while Hormuz-routed Saudi liftings to India collapsed to near zero.
The total volume Saudi Arabia supplied to India barely changed. What changed completely was the loading geography.
Not Just Saudi: The Same Pattern at Fujairah
The UAE-India crude trade shows a structurally similar shift, with one important distinction.
Before the disruption, UAE crude reached Indian refiners through an approximate 70/30 split: Persian Gulf-side terminals — Jebel Dhanna, Das Island, and Ruwais — dominated exports, while Fujairah and Khor Fakkan on the Sea of Oman side carried a meaningful but secondary share.
By April 2026, that split had reversed.
Weekly UAE-to-India crude flows remained in the 0.40–0.55 mbpd range, but almost all volumes loaded through Fujairah, while Hormuz-side liftings fell effectively to zero through most of the month.
The Russian Pillar and a Structural Break
Russia has emerged as the second pillar of India’s adjusted crude supply slate, but its contribution carries fragility that headline volume data alone obscures.
AXSMarine vessel-tracking data shows Russian crude deliveries to Indian ports averaged 1.95 mbpd in April 2026. The geographic breakdown tells the more important story:
- Baltic terminals (Ust-Luga, Primorsk): 0.91 mbpd
- Black Sea terminals (Novorossiysk): 0.72 mbpd
- Russian Pacific terminals (Kozmino, De-Kastri): 0.32 mbpd
The historical context makes the anomaly clear.
Across 2023, 2024, and 2025, Russian crude flows to India generally fluctuated within a stable 1.0–2.0 mbpd range, with a median trajectory near 1.6 mbpd.
In 2026, however, flows broke through this historical envelope twice — and in opposite directions.
February 2026 fell to 0.96 mbpd, near the bottom of the historical range. March then surged to 2.26 mbpd, well above the three-year maximum, as the US sanctions waiver activated and Russian exporters accelerated loadings during the compliance window.
April moderated to 1.95 mbpd, but still remained above the historical median.
This was not simply seasonal volatility. It represented a structural break driven by two simultaneous forces: the US sanctions waiver and Indian refiners’ urgent need to replace collapsed Hormuz-linked supply.
On May 3, Ukrainian drone strikes hit Primorsk — Russia’s largest Baltic crude export terminal, with approximately 1 mbpd of capacity — and damaged two shadow-fleet tankers approaching Novorossiysk, both critical gateways for Russian crude flows to India.
Russian western port loadings held near March levels through April despite earlier strikes, demonstrating significant operational resilience. Nevertheless, the supply pillar that absorbed much of the Hormuz disruption is now itself under growing pressure.
The Wider Picture: India's Supply Slate Concentrates
Stepping back from the country-level pivots reveals the broader structural shift.
Before the disruption, India’s crude slate was diversified across more than ten suppliers and three loading basins: Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Russia, Iran, Venezuela, the United States, and smaller flows from Africa and Latin America.
Total weekly Indian crude intake in late 2025 and early 2026 generally ranged between 4.5 and 5.5 mbpd, supported by broad supplier diversification that gave refiners both grade flexibility and commercial leverage.
By April 2026, that slate had narrowed considerably. Iraq’s exports remained shut. Kuwait and Qatar were operating near zero, both remaining heavily dependent on the Strait of Hormuz with no operational bypass infrastructure.
As a result, the Persian Gulf share of India’s total crude intake collapsed from roughly 60% to 35% in just two months. The shortfall was increasingly filled by Atlantic Basin supply:
- Russian Baltic and Black Sea exports, which more than doubled relative to their Q1 baseline
- US Gulf Coast cargoes
- West African crude
- Latin American exports
Iran and Venezuela also resumed shipments to India in April, averaging 151 kbpd and 258 kbpd respectively.
The substitution dynamic becomes even clearer when broken into structural supply pillars. Through February, Inside Hormuz flows alone routinely supplied 2.5–3.0 mbpd in any given week, while Outside Hormuz bypass corridors — primarily Yanbu and Fujairah — contributed only 0–0.4 mbpd.
By April, the picture had reversed. Inside Hormuz flows collapsed to just 0.2–0.9 mbpd weekly, while Outside Hormuz volumes surged to 1.2–1.8 mbpd.
Meanwhile, the broader “Rest of World” component remained relatively stable at roughly 2.5–3.0 mbpd throughout both periods, though with a significant internal rotation toward Russian-origin crude.
Total weekly Indian crude intake fell from its late-2025 average of roughly 5.5 mbpd into a 4.0–4.5 mbpd range through April — a contraction of approximately 20–25%.
Supplier composition shifted dramatically.
Russia remained near 2.0 mbpd weekly, becoming India’s single largest crude origin. Iraq — which previously supplied 1.0–1.5 mbpd — collapsed to just 0.1–0.3 mbpd.
The most Hormuz-dependent suppliers — Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar — effectively exited the Indian crude slate, partially replaced by Saudi Yanbu, UAE Fujairah, and incremental Russian exports.
India’s supply geography has therefore shifted from broad diversification toward a much narrower system dominated by two bypass pipelines — Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline and the UAE’s ADCOP pipeline — alongside growing dependence on Russian Atlantic Basin exports.
What the Data Says About Where the System Stands
At headline level, the data could suggest that the Hormuz bypass system is functioning effectively and that India’s crude supply chain has proven resilient. The underlying picture is more complicated.
Three observable realities define the system as of April 2026. First, the Hormuz disruption was only partially offset. Indian crude intake contracted materially rather than remaining stable. Total weekly imports fell from a pre-disruption range of 4.5–5.5 mbpd to approximately 3.9–4.7 mbpd through April. Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar — together representing roughly 1.5–2.0 mbpd of pre-disruption Indian crude intake — collapsed to near zero due to the absence of operational bypass infrastructure. Replacement volumes covered only part of the gap:
- Saudi Yanbu: peak weekly flows of 1.43 mbpd
- UAE Fujairah: roughly 0.40–0.55 mbpd
- Incremental Russian exports above their historical envelope
Together, these replacement flows compensated for only around 35–40% of the disrupted supply.
Second, the Atlantic Basin’s growing role is both real and structurally significant — but also increasingly fragile. Russian Baltic and Black Sea terminals together supplied approximately 1.63 mbpd to India in April, well above their historical 2023–2025 range.
On May 3, Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Primorsk and damaged shadow-fleet tankers approaching Novorossiysk. Although Russian western port loadings remained resilient through April, sustained infrastructure pressure could significantly compress Atlantic Basin exports to India.
If that occurs, replacement barrels would need to come increasingly from the US Gulf Coast, West Africa, and Latin America — supply origins associated with substantially longer voyage distances and different freight economics.
AXSMarine voyage data already shows growing US, Brazilian, and Caribbean participation in India’s import slate. Whether those flows can scale quickly enough is what the coming months will test.
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